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Abstract It is a long-standing puzzle why verbs like believe and think take declara-
tive but not interrogative complements (e.g., *Bill believes whether Mary left), while
closely related verbs like know and be certain take both kinds of complements. We
show that this contrast can be derived from the fact that believe and think, unlike
know and be certain, are neg-raising verbs.
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1 Introduction
Certain clause-embedding verbs take both declarative and interrogative complements,
as shown in (1) for know. Others take only declarative complements, as illustrated
in (2) for believe, or only interrogative complements, as seen in (3) for wonder.
(1) Bill knows that/whether/what Mary has eaten.
(2) Bill believes that/*whether/*what Mary has eaten.
(3) Bill wonders whether/what/*that Mary has eaten.
Verbs like know are referred to as responsive verbs, verbs like wonder as rogative
verbs, and verbs like believe as anti-rogative verbs. Any account that aims at explain-
ing the distribution of clausal complements will have to capture both the selectional
restrictions of rogative and anti-rogative verbs and the selectional flexibility of re-
sponsive verbs. Most accounts of clausal complements assume a type distinction
between declarative and interrogative complements (e.g., Karttunen 1977; Heim
1994; Dayal 1996; Lahiri 2002; Spector & Egré 2015; Uegaki 2015b). Usually,
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declarative complements are taken to have type 〈s, t〉, while interrogative comple-
ments are taken to have type 〈〈s, t〉, t〉. The selectional restrictions of (anti-)rogative
verbs can then be captured by postulating that rogative verbs take arguments of type
〈〈s, t〉, t〉, while anti-rogative verbs take arguments of type 〈s, t〉. On the other hand,
to capture the selectional flexibility of responsive verbs, these accounts assume an
operator that shifts the type of interrogatives into that of declaratives, or vice versa.
This approach, however, has its limitations. First, as soon as we admit type-
shifting, we lose part of the account of selectional restrictions. This is because, if we
introduce an operator that adapts the type of interrogatives to that of declaratives (as
in, e.g., Heim 1994), then this operator would also resolve the type conflict when
anti-rogative verbs like believe take interrogative complements. Thus, in this case,
we lose the account of the selectional restrictions of anti-rogatives. On the other
hand, for analogous reasons, if the type-shifter adapts the type of declaratives to that
of interrogatives (as in Uegaki 2015b), the account of the selectional restrictions of
rogative verbs is lost. Thus, type-distinction-based accounts do not directly capture
the selectional restrictions of both rogative and anti-rogative predicates at once. The
selectional restrictions of one of these verb classes needs to be derived from factors
other than the postulated type-distinction between declaratives and interrogatives.
A second drawback is that, in the absence of independent motivation for the
type-distinction between declarative and interrogative complements and for the
assumptions that are made as to which clause-embedding verbs require which type
of argument, the approach remains stipulative.1 An account which derives the
selectional restrictions of (anti-)rogatives from independently observable properties
of these verbs would be preferable.
The present paper assumes a uniform account of clausal complements, which
has been motivated on independent grounds in Theiler et al. (2016). The account is
uniform in the sense that it assigns the same semantic type to declarative and inter-
rogative complements, namely 〈〈s, t〉, t〉, and it assumes that all clause-embedding
verbs take arguments of this type. On such an account, the selectional flexibility of
responsive verbs is directly predicted, without any type-shifting operations. On the
other hand, the selectional restrictions of (anti-)rogatives need to be explained based
on independently observable properties of the relevant verbs. Such an explanation
has recently been given for wonder and some closely related rogative verbs (Cia-
rdelli & Roelofsen 2015; Uegaki 2015b).2 The present paper does so for two classes
1 It must be noted that such motivation is not completely absent: Uegaki (2015a) provides an explicit
argument for his assumption that verbs like believe require an argument of type 〈s, t〉 while verbs
like know require an argument of type 〈〈s, t〉, t〉. However, this argument does not seem entirely
conclusive; see Theiler, Roelofsen & Aloni (2016) for detailed discussion.
2 The proposals of Ciardelli & Roelofsen (2015) and Uegaki (2015b) are very much in the same spirit.
For discussion of the subtle differences between them, see Theiler et al. (2016).
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of anti-rogative verbs, namely (i) neg-raising verbs like believe and think and (ii)
truth-evaluating predicates like be true and be false.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly lays out our uniform account
of clausal complements, and exemplifies our treatment of responsive verbs. Section 3
derives the selectional restrictions of neg-raising verbs, and Section 4 those of truth-
evaluating verbs. Section 5 discusses some closely related work, and Section 6
concludes.
2 A uniform treatment of clausal complements
Our treatment of clausal complements is couched in inquisitive semantics (Ciardelli,
Groenendijk & Roelofsen 2013, 2015). In this framework, declarative and inter-
rogative clauses are taken to have the same kind of semantic value, namely a set
of propositions. The conceptual motivation behind this uniform notion of sentence
meaning is as follows. While traditionally the meaning of a sentence ϕ is taken
to capture just the information conveyed by ϕ , in inquisitive semantics it is taken
to additionally capture the issue expressed by ϕ as well. We call the information
that is conveyed by a sentence its informative content, and the issue expressed by
it its inquisitive content. To encode both kinds of content at once, the meaning of
a sentence is construed as a set of propositions, no matter whether the sentence is
declarative or interrogative.
By uttering a sentence ϕ with meaning JϕK, a speaker is taken to raise an issue
whose resolution requires establishing one of the propositions in JϕK (the so-called
resolutions), while simultaneously providing the information that the actual world is
contained in the union of these propositions,
⋃JϕK. ⋃JϕK is the informative content
of ϕ , written as info(ϕ).
2.1 Downward-closure, alternatives, and truth
Sentence meanings in inquisitive semantics are downward closed: if p ∈ JϕK and
q⊂ p, then also q ∈ JϕK. This captures the intuition that, if a proposition p resolves
a given issue, then any stronger proposition q⊂ p will also resolve that issue. As
a limit case, it is assumed that the inconsistent proposition, /0, trivially resolves all
issues, and is therefore included in the meaning of every sentence. The maximal
elements in JϕK are referred to as the alternatives in JϕK and the set of these
alternatives is denoted as alt(ϕ). Alternatives are those propositions that contain
precisely enough information to resolve the issue expressed by ϕ . Finally, from the
meaning of a sentence in inquisitive semantics, its truth-conditions are derived in the
following way: ϕ is true in a world w just in case w is compatible with info(ϕ), i.e.,
w ∈ info(ϕ).
250
What’s wrong with believing whether?
wab wa
wb w /0
(a) that Ann left
wab wa
wb w /0
(b) whether Ann left
wab wa
wb w /0
(c) who left
Figure 1 Examples of complement clause meanings in inquisitive semantics.
2.2 Informative and inquisitive sentences
The informative content of ϕ can be trivial, namely iff the propositions in JϕK
cover the entire logical space W , i.e., iff info(ϕ) = W . In this case, we call ϕ
non-informative. Conversely, we call ϕ informative iff info(ϕ) 6=W . Not only the
informative content, but also the inquisitive content of a sentence can be trivial.
This is the case iff the issue expressed by ϕ is already resolved by the information
provided by ϕ itself, i.e., iff info(ϕ) ∈ JϕK. In this case, we call ϕ non-inquisitive.
Conversely, ϕ is called inquisitive iff info(ϕ) 6∈ JϕK. If ϕ is non-inquisitive, its
meaning contains a unique alternative, namely info(ϕ). Vice versa, if JϕK contains
multiple alternatives, it is inquisitive.
2.3 Declarative and interrogative complements
Following Ciardelli et al. (2015) and much earlier work in inquisitive semantics, we
assume that a declarative complement or matrix clause ϕ is never inquisitive.3 That
is, its meaning JϕK always contains a single alternative, which coincides with its
informative content, info(ϕ). For example:
(4) alt(that Ann left) =
{ {w | Ann left in w} }
Conversely, we assume that an interrogative complement or matrix clause is never
informative. This means that the alternatives associated with an interrogative clause
always completely cover the set of all possible worlds.4 For example, if the domain
3 There is also work in inquisitive semantics that does not make this assumption (e.g., AnderBois 2012),
but this requires a view under which uttering an inquisitive sentence does not necessarily involve
issuing a request for information. See Ciardelli, Groenendijk & Roelofsen (2012) for discussion.
4 For simplicity we leave the presuppositions of complement clauses out of consideration here; the
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of discourse consists of Ann and Bob, we assume the following sets of alternatives
for the interrogative complements whether Ann left and who left.5
(5) alt(whether Ann left) =
{ {w | Ann left in w},
{w | Ann didn’t leave in w}
}
(6) alt(who left) =

{w | Ann left in w},
{w | Bob left in w},
{w | nobody left in w}

The alternative sets in (4)–(6) are also depicted in Figure 1, where wab and wa are
worlds where Ann left, wb and w /0 are worlds where Ann didn’t leave, wab and wb
are worlds where Bill left, and wa and w /0 are worlds where Bill didn’t leave.
2.4 Responsive verbs: a brief illustration
Before dealing with the selectional restrictions of anti-rogative verbs, let us first
briefly specify a lexical entry for the responsive verb be certain, showing how its
selectional flexibility is immediately captured.6,7 In the entry below, P is the meaning
of the clausal complement, its semantic type 〈〈s, t〉, t〉 is abbreviated as T , and DOXwx
is the doxastic state of the subject x in world w.8
(7) Jbe certainKw = λPT .λx. DOXwx ∈ P
As illustrated by the following examples, this entry uniformly handles declarative
and interrogative complements, which are both of type T .
(8) Mary is certain that John left.
 True in w iff DOXwm ⊆ {w | John left in w}
proposed account can be extended in a straightforward way to deal with such presuppositions.
5 The alternatives assumed here for wh-interrogatives only allow us to derive non-exhaustive (mention-
some) readings. The account can be refined to derive strongly and intermediate exhaustive readings
too (see Theiler et al. 2016). This refinement doesn’t affect any of the results presented here.
6 We consider be certain here rather than know because the latter involves a factivity presupposition,
which makes its lexical entry somewhat more complex (see Theiler et al. 2016 for discussion of know
as well as several other responsive verbs).
7 Mayr (2017) claims that be certain only licenses interrogative complements in negative environments;
not in plain episodic, positive sentences. Recent experimental results, however, show that while there
is indeed a slight contrast in acceptability between interrogative complements under be certain and
under know in plain episodic sentences, in both cases the acceptability rate is relatively high, much
higher than for similar sentences with believe (van Gessel, Cremers & Roelofsen 2017).
8 For simplicity, we give truth-conditional entries here. For a full-fledged compositional inquisitive
semantics, these can easily be transformed into support-conditional entries (see Ciardelli, Roelofsen
& Theiler 2016).
252
What’s wrong with believing whether?
(9) Mary is certain whether John left.
 True in w iff ∃p ∈
{{w | John left in w},
{w | John didn’t leave in w}
}
s.t. DOXwm ⊆ p
The present approach thus yields a more economical treatment of responsive verbs
than approaches that assume a type distinction between declarative and interrogative
complements. It is not necessary here to assume a type-shifting operation (or
multiple lexical entries for each responsive verb). Moreover, as discussed in detail
in Theiler et al. 2016, the approach avoids certain thorny problems, brought to light
by George (2011) and Elliott, Klinedinst, Sudo & Uegaki (2017), for mainstream
theories which assume a type-shifting operation from D〈〈s,t〉,t〉 to D〈s,t〉. It should
be noted, however, that these problems are also avoided by the approach of Uegaki
(2015b), which assumes a type-shifting operation in the opposite direction.
3 Neg-raising verbs
We will now turn our attention to anti-rogative verbs, which is a rather heterogeneous
group of verbs. Among these are attitude verbs like think and believe,9 likelihood
predicates such as seem and be likely, speech-act verbs like claim and assert, and
truth-evaluating verbs like be true and be false.
3.1 Zuber’s observation: all neg-raising verbs are anti-rogative
It has been observed that—diverse as the class of anti-rogative verbs may be—
there is something that many of them have in common, namely, many of them
are neg-raising. This means, at first pass, that they license the following kind of
inference:10
9 In this paper, we will set aside the observation that in certain constructions believe does in fact take
interrogative complements. Two examples are given in (i-a-b):
(i) a. You won’t believe who won!
b. He just wouldn’t believe me who I was.
c. *You won’t think who won!
d. *You won’t believe whether Mary won!
Note that, as illustrated in (i-c), other anti-rogative verbs do not seem to exceptionally license inter-
rogative complements in these configurations, and as illustrated in (i-d), while believe exceptionally
licenses wh-interrogatives in these cases, polar interrogative complements are still unacceptable.
Finally, note that believe seems to become factive when it felicitously embeds an interrogative
complement. Further investigation of this peculiar phenomenon must be left for another occasion.
10 See, e.g., Horn 1989; Gajewski 2007 for a characterization of neg-raising predicates in terms of strict
NPI licensing, which is arguably more reliable but would take us a bit too far afield here.
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(10) Mary does not believe that Ann left.
∴Mary believes that Ann did not leave.
Zuber (1982) claims that all neg-raising verbs are anti-rogative. Indeed, examining
the class of neg-raisers, it doesn’t seem possible to find a counterexample to this
generalization. Some anti-rogative neg-raisers are given in (11).
(11) believe, think, feel, expect, want, seem, be likely
We will show that once we add a treatment of neg-raising to our present account of
clausal embedding, then, indeed, anti-rogativity will follow. In our discussion, we
will focus on the case of believe, and indicate how the account can be extended to
other neg-raising verbs.
Note, however, that Zuber’s generalization does not hold in the other direction;
there are several anti-rogative verbs that are not neg-raising:
(12) desire, claim, assert, suggest, be true, be false11
This means that an analysis which derives anti-rogativity from neg-raising will not
cover all anti-rogative verbs. In Section 4, we will consider the truth-evaluating
verbs be true and be false. Explaining the anti-rogativity of the remaining verbs
in (12) is left for future work.
3.2 Deriving neg-raising from an excluded-middle presupposition
We start with a preliminary entry for believe, which is identical to that of be certain
from Section 2.4 and which doesn’t yet capture the fact that believe is neg-raising.
(13) JbelieveKw = λP〈〈s,t〉,t〉.λx. DOXwx ∈ P (preliminary entry)
We adopt a presuppositional account of neg-raising, which was originally proposed
by Bartsch (1973) and further developed by Gajewski (2007).12 On this account,
11 Be true/false aren’t categorized as neg-raising here, although they do license neg-raising inferences.
This is because, as illustrated in (i), negated be true/false don’t license strict NPIs, unlike verbs like
think and believe; see also footnote 10 above.
(i) a. *It isn’t true that Mary will leave until June.
b. John doesn’t think that Mary will leave until June.
As we will see in a moment, we will assume that neg-raising verbs involve a so-called excluded
middle presupposition (Bartsch 1973; Gajewski 2007). Assuming that be true/false involve such a
presupposition would make wrong predictions about the licensing of strict NPIs.
12 Besides the presuppositional account of neg-raising, there are also accounts based on implicatures
(e.g., Romoli 2013) or homogeneity (Gajewski 2005; Križ 2015); see Križ (2015: Ch.6) for a recent
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neg-raising behavior results from a so-called excluded-middle (EM) presupposition,
carried by all neg-raising verbs. For instance, sentence (14) presupposes that Mary is
opinionated as to whether Ann left: she either believes that Ann left or she believes
that Ann didn’t leave.
(14) Mary believes that Ann left.
Presupposition: M believes that A left or M believes that A didn’t leave.
In (14), the presupposition easily goes unnoticed, though, since it is weaker than the
asserted content. On the other hand, if we negate (14), presupposed and asserted
content are logically independent. Taken together, they imply that Mary believes
Ann didn’t leave—which accounts for the neg-raising effect.
(15) Mary doesn’t believe that Ann left.
Presupposition: M believes that A left or M believes that A didn’t leave.
∴Mary believes that Ann didn’t leave.
Bartsch (1973) notes that neg-raising inferences are defeasible. That is, she observes
that in cases like (16), where the opinionatedness assumption is explicitly suspended,
the neg-raising inference does not arise:
(16) Bill doesn’t know who killed Caesar. He isn’t even sure whether or not
Brutus and Caesar lived at the same time. So, naturally. . .
Bill doesn’t believe that Brutus killed Caesar.
6 Bill believes that Brutus didn’t kill Caesar
We assume, following Gajewski (2007), that the excluded middle presupposition
is locally accommodated in such cases, in order to obtain an interpretation that is
consistent with the contextually given information.13
3.3 A generalized EM presupposition
If we want to add the EM presupposition to our uniform lexical entry for believe,
repeated in (17), there is one more thing to take into account.
overview and comparison. We leave open at this point whether the generalization that neg-raising
verbs are anti-rogative can also be derived on these other accounts.
13 Gajewski (2007) emphasizes that the excluded middle presupposition of neg-raising predicates,
because of its defeasibility, should be regarded as a soft presupposition in the sense of Abusch (2002,
2010). However, his actual account of their defeasibility is in terms of local accommodation and does
not seem to explicitly rely on the assumption that they are soft presuppositions in Abusch’s sense. It
does assume, of course, that their local accommodation under negation is relatively unproblematic, in
contrast with presuppositions contributed by other triggers, such as it-clefts.
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(17) JbelieveKw = λPT .λx. DOXwx ∈ P (preliminary entry)
Since the clausal argument P that believe takes on our account is not a single
proposition but a set of propositions, we cannot compute its negation by taking its
set-theoretical complement. Rather, we will use the standard negation operation
from inquisitive semantics, written as ¬ . When applied to a sentence meaning P
this operation returns the set of those propositions that are inconsistent with every
member of P:14
(18) ¬ P := {p | ∀q ∈ P : p∩q = /0}
Using inquisitive negation, we arrive at the lexical entry in (19). We will refer to the
EM presupposition in this setting as the generalized EM presupposition, as it applies
to both declarative and interrogative complements.
(19) JbelieveKw = λPT .λx : DOXwx ∈ P∨DOXwx ∈ ¬ P . DOXwx ∈ P
What will be crucial for our account of the selectional restrictions of neg-raising
verbs is that the effect of the generalized EM presupposition depends on whether P
is the meaning of a declarative or an interrogative complement.
Declarative complements. As discussed in Section 2, we assume that declarative
complements are never inquisitive. This means that if P is the meaning of a declara-
tive complement, it contains only one alternative p. Then, the first disjunct in the
presupposition amounts to DOXwx ⊆ p (x believes that p), while the second disjunct
amounts to DOXwx ∩ p = /0 (x believes that ¬p). Hence, for declarative complements,
our generalized rendering of the EM presupposition boils down to the ordinary
version of this presupposition.
Interrogative complements. On the other hand, we assume that interrogative
complements are never informative, and typically inquisitive. This means that the
alternatives in the meaning of an interrogative complement, taken together, always
cover the entire logical space. As a consequence, the inquisitive negation of an
interrogative complement meaning P always is ¬ P = { /0} since there can be no non-
empty proposition that is inconsistent with every alternative in P. This means that the
second disjunct of the presupposition can only be satisfied in DOXwx = /0. Under the
standard assumption that doxastic states are consistent, this is impossible. Moreover,
even if we want to allow for inconsistent doxastic states, the second disjunct of the
14 There is both conceptual and empirical support for this way of treating negation in inquisitive
semantics. Conceptually, it can be characterized in terms of exactly the same algebraic properties as
the standard truth-conditional negation operator (Roelofsen 2013a). Empirical support comes, for
instance, from sluicing constructions (AnderBois 2014).
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presupposition can only be satisfied if the first disjunct is satisfied as well, since /0
is contained in any complement meaning P. Thus, with or without the assumption
that doxastic states are consistent, the second disjunct in the presupposition turns
out redundant. That is, if believe takes an interrogative complement, its lexical entry
reduces to (20).
(20) JbelieveKw = λPT .λx : DOXwx ∈ P. DOXwx ∈ P
The presupposed and the asserted content in (20) are exactly the same. This means
that when believe combines with an interrogative complement, its assertive compo-
nent is trivial relative to its presupposition. In the following sections we will show
that this triviality is a systematic triviality in the sense of Gajewski (2002) and that it
can thus be taken to explain the anti-rogative nature of believe and other neg-raisers.
3.4 L-analyticity
What we mean here by systematic triviality is that the meaning of a sentence in
which a neg-raising verb embeds an interrogative complement comes out as trivial
independently of the exact lexical material that appears in the sentence. In particular,
it doesn’t matter which exact verb is used—the triviality only depends on the fact
that the verb is neg-raising—and it doesn’t matter which lexical material appears
in the complement—the triviality only depends on the fact that the complement is
interrogative.
In contrast, there are also cases of non-systematic triviality such as the tautology
in (21), which does rely on the presence of specific lexical material.
(21) Every tree is a tree.
Gajewski (2002) suggests that cases of systematic triviality can be delineated from
cases of non-systematic triviality in terms of the notion of logical analyticity (for
short, L-analyticity). If a sentence is L-analytical, we do not perceive its triviality
as logical deviance, as we do in cases of non-systematic triviality such as (21).
Rather, according to Gajewski, L-analyticity manifests itself at the level of grammar:
L-analytical sentences are perceived as being ungrammatical. An example of a
phenomenon that Gajewski accounts for using this line of argument is the definiteness
restriction in existential statements, exemplified by (22). Below we will see how he
recasts a prominent analysis of this restriction, originally due to Barwise & Cooper
(1981), in terms of L-analyticity.
(22) *There is every tall tree.
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Logical words. The notion of L-analyticity builds upon the distinction between
logical and non-logical vocabulary. Intuitively, this distinction is easy to grasp;
it runs along the lines of words that have lexical content versus words that don’t.
Among the logical words are quantifiers like a or every, connectives like and or if
and copulas like is. Among the non-logical words, on the other hand, are predicates
like tree, run and green. There is no general agreement in the literature on a single
definition of the class of logical words. Abrusán (2014) provides an overview of
definitions that have been proposed, most of them based on invariance conditions.
For the purposes of this paper, we will assume that a suitable definition of logical
words can in principle be given. As far as we can see, the items that we will classify
as logical are uncontroversially so, meaning that they should also come out as logical
under any suitable definition of logicality.
Logical skeleton. To determine if a given sentence is L-analytical, we first com-
pute its logical skeleton (LS) using the algorithm from Gajewski 2002. Let α be the
logical form (LF) of the sentence. Then we obtain the LS from α by (i) identifying
the maximal constituents of α that don’t contain any logical items, and (ii) replacing
each such constituent β with a fresh constant of the same type as that of β . For
example, the LFs and LSs of Every tree is a tree and There is every tall tree are
given in (23) and (24). In (23), the maximal constituents of the LF not containing
any logical items are the two instances of tree. In (24), the only maximal non-logical
constituent of the LF is the phrase tall tree.
(23) Every tree is a tree.
Logical form: Logical skeleton:
every tree is a tree
 
every P is a Q
(24) *There is every tall tree.
there
is
every tall tree
 there
is every P
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L-analyticity and ungrammaticality. We adopt the following assumptions about
L-analyticity and ungrammaticality from Gajewski 2009.
Assumption 1 (L-analyticity). A sentential constituent S is L-analytical just in case
S’s LS receives the denotation 1 (or 0) for all interpretations in which its denotation
is defined.
Assumption 2 (Ungrammaticality). A sentence is perceived as ungrammatical if it
contains an L-analytical constituent.
For example, consider the interpretation of the LS in (23):
(25) Jevery P is a QK〈D,I〉 = JeveryK〈D,I〉(I(P))(I(Q))
It is possible to find two interpretations I1 and I2 such that Jevery P is a QK〈D,I1〉 6=Jevery P is a QK〈D,I2〉. Hence, (23) does not come out as L-analytical. This is
expected, as this sentence is a non-systematic tautology.
On the other hand, consider the interpretation of the LS in (24), given in (26)
below. Following Barwise & Cooper (1981), we assume that there simply denotes
the domain of individuals De.
(26) Jthere is every PK〈D,I〉 = JeveryK(I(P))(JthereK〈D,I〉)
= JeveryK〈D,I〉(I(P))(De)
It isn’t possible to find an interpretation I such that Jthere is every PK〈D,I〉 = 0,
because I(P) ⊆ De for all I. This means that, as expected, (24) comes out as
L-analytical, which accounts for its ungrammaticality.
3.5 Capturing the anti-rogativity of neg-raising verbs in terms of L-analyticity
Let us now return to the selectional restrictions of neg-raising verbs and see how the
account sketched in Section 3.3 can be made fully explicit by phrasing it in terms of
L-analyticity. In order to do so, two assumptions about the structure of interrogative
clauses and neg-raising predicates are needed.
Interrogative clauses are headed by a question operator. Firstly, we asssume
that interrogative clauses are headed by a question operator, written as ‘?’. Semanti-
cally, this operator takes the semantic value of its prejacent P as its input, and yields
P∪¬ P as its output:
(27) J?Kw = λPT .P∪¬ P
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In terms of alternatives, ? adds to the alternatives already contained in P one ad-
ditional alternative, which is the set-theoretic complement of the union of all the
alternatives in P. This is a standard operation in inquisitive semantics (see, e.g., Cia-
rdelli et al. 2015). Note that it always results in a set of alternatives which together
cover the entire logical space, i.e., a sentence meaning that is non-informative.15
Lexical decomposition of neg-raising predicates. Secondly, we assume that a
neg-raising predicate V is decomposed at LF into two components, REM andMV ,
the former of which but not the latter is a logical item in the relevant sense. While
REM is common to all neg-raising predicates,MV is specific to the predicate V .16
An LF in which believe is decomposed into these two components is given in (28).
(28)
John
REM Mbelieve ?
Mary left
The non-logical component,MV , is a function that maps an individual x to a modal
base. Which modal base this is gets determined by the verb V . In the case of, e.g.,
believe, it is x’s doxastic state, while in the case of want it is x’s bouletic state:
(29) a. JMbelieve(x)Kw = DOXwx
b. JMwant(x)Kw = BOULwx
The logical component, REM, does two things: it triggers the EM presupposition and
acts as compositional glue by connectingMV to the subject and the complement:
(30) JREMK = λM〈e,st〉.λP〈st,t〉.λx : M (x) ∈ P ∨M (x) ∈ ¬ P.M (x) ∈ P
REM takes the functionMV , the complement meaning P and the subject x as ar-
guments; it contributes the soft EM presupposition (the modal baseMV (x) has to
be a resolution either of P or of the negation of P); and it asserts thatMV (x) is a
resolution of P. Intuitively, REM is a logical item because it does not contribute any
“contingent content” of its own: its denotation, in contrast to that ofMV , does not
vary between models.
15 The exact treatment of the question operator does not really matter for our purposes. The only
thing that is crucial, is that it always results in non-informativity. In particular, our account is also
compatible with a treatment of the question operator under which it (i) only adds an additional
alternative if its input P is not yet inquisitive, and (ii) adds a presupposition to the effect that at least
one of the alternatives in its output is true (Roelofsen 2013b).
16 Boškovic´ & Gajewski (2011) propose a very similar decomposition of neg-raising predicates, moti-
vated on independent grounds.
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L-analyticity. We now have all the ingredients needed to show that the trivial
sentence meanings we identified in Section 3.3 are L-analytical. There, we had
found that whenever a neg-raising attitude verb like believe combines with an
interrogative complement, as in (31), its asserted content is trivial relative to its
presupposition.
(31) *John believes whether Mary left.
Let’s start by constructing the LS for (31): the subject, the complement clause and
the functionMbelieve each get substituted by a fresh constant, while both REM and
the interrogative marker remain untouched.
(32)
John
REM Mbelieve ?
whether Mary left
 d
REM MV ? P
The denotation of this LS is given in (33-a), its soft presupposition in (33-b).
(33) a. Asserted content: JMV (d)K ∈ J?PK
b. Presupposition: JMV (d)K ∈ J?PK or JMV (d)K ∈ J¬ ?PK
Let’s first look at the second disjunct in the presupposition. We find that, no mat-
ter what P is, the set of propositions in J?PK〈D,I〉 covers the entire logical space.
Hence, we also know that J¬ ?PK〈D,I〉 = { /0} for all I. The second disjunct in the
presupposition is thus only satisfied if JMV (d)K〈D,I〉 = /0. But if this holds, then the
first disjunct is also satisfied, since J?PK〈D,I〉 always contains /0. This means that the
second disjunct in the presupposition is vacuous.
Turning to the non-vacuous first disjunct in the presupposition, we find that it
is identical with the asserted content. But this means that, for all interpretations in
which the denotation of the LS is defined, this denotation will be 1. Sentence (31)
hence comes out as L-analytical, which is what we set out to show.
Anti-rogativity and defeasibility of neg-raising. Finally, let us return to a case
in which the neg-raising inference is suspended, repeated in (34) below.
(34) Bill doesn’t know who killed Caesar. He isn’t even sure whether or not
Brutus and Caesar lived at the same time. So, naturally. . .
Bill doesn’t believe that Brutus killed Caesar.
6 Bill believes that Brutus didn’t kill Caesar
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One might expect that in such contexts, since the neg-raising inference of the verb
does not really surface, the incompatibility with interrogative complements will
also be lifted. This is not the case, however. As witnessed in (35), interrogative
complements are still unacceptable in such configurations.
(35) Bill doesn’t know who killed Caesar. He isn’t even sure whether or not
Brutus and Caesar lived at the same time. So, naturally. . .
*Bill doesn’t believe whether Brutus killed Caesar.
This is correctly predicted by our account. Recall that Gajewski’s (2009) general
theory of L-analyticity holds that for a sentence to be perceived as ungrammatical
it is sufficient that a constituent of its logical form is L-analytical. This is indeed
the case in (35): even though the full sentence is not L-analytical (assuming that
the EM presupposition is locally accommodated), the clause that gets negated (Bill
believes whether Brutus killed Caesar) is L-analytical. This is sufficient to explain
the perceived ungrammaticality.
4 Truth-evaluating verbs: be true and be false
We have seen above how the selectional restrictions of a substantial class of anti-
rogative verbs, namely those that are neg-raising, can be derived. We now turn to
another, much smaller class of anti-rogatives consisting of the truth-evaluating verbs
be true and be false.
We treat truth-evaluating verbs in the obvious way: be true and be false take a
clausal complement and assert that this complement is true or false, respectively.
Recall that in inquisitive semantics, a clause ϕ is true in a world w just in case
w ∈ info(ϕ), where info(ϕ) =⋃JϕK. Thus we assume the following lexical entries:
(36) a. Jbe trueKw = λPT .w ∈ info(P)
b. Jbe falseKw = λPT .w 6∈ info(P)
When combined with a declarative complement, these entries give the expected
results. What happens if they take an interrogative complement, though? We have
seen in Section 2, that if P is an interrogative complement, its informative content
covers the entire logical space, i.e., info(P) =W . In this case, the truth conditions
for be true amount to w ∈W , a tautology, while the truth conditions for be false
amount to w 6∈W , a contradiction. Hence, when taking interrogative complements,
be true and be false systematically yield trivial sentence meanings. Assuming that be
true and be false constitute logical vocabulary, these are again cases of L-analyticity.
The reader might wonder why we went all the way to deriving the anti-rogativity
of verbs like believe in terms of neg-raising—seeing that we could have simply
treated all anti-rogative verbs as being sensitive only to the informative content
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(and not the inquisitive content) of their complement. The reason is that while this
assumption is natural for be true and be false, it would be highly stipulative for
verbs like believe. To see this, recall that while believe does not take interrogative
complements, closely related verbs like know and be certain do. Thus, we would
have to assume that while believe is only sensitive to the informative content of its
complement, know and be certain aren’t. We see no independent motivation for such
an assumption. Thus, an account that would derive the anti-rogativity of believe from
insensitivity to inquisitive content would be more stipulative than one that derives
it from the fact that believe is neg-raising, a property that sets the verb apart from
know and be certain on independent grounds.
5 Some remarks on closely related work
Evidently, the present paper greatly draws from Zuber (1982)’s observation about
the connection between anti-rogativity and neg-raising. Zuber’s work was brought
to our attention through the insightful discussion of clausal embedding in Egré 2008.
However, neither Zuber (1982) nor Egré (2008) succeeded in deriving anti-rogativity
from neg-raising in a principled way.
Independently of the present paper, Cohen (2017) and Mayr (2017) have also
recently proposed ways to explain the observed connection.17 While these accounts
are largely in the same spirit as ours, they are, in their current shape, more limited
in scope and less explicit in some important regards. In particular, neither of them
explicitly shows that embedding an interrogative clause under a neg-raising verb
gives rise to L-analyticity.
Moreover, the account of Mayr (2017) is restricted to polar interrogative com-
plements (the case of wh-interrogatives is left for future work), and it implicitly
relies on a particular mechanism of presupposition projection—to see whether this
is tenable it would have to be specified in more detail.
On the other hand, the account of Cohen (2017) in its current form wrongly
predicts that under negation, neg-raising verbs do take interrogative complements.
Moreover, it assumes that the EM presupposition of neg-raising verbs is pragmatic
rather than semantic. As noted by Horn (1978), EM presuppositions are expected to
arise much more widely under this assumption than they actually do. In particular, it
becomes difficult, if not impossible, to account for the fact that verbs like believe
trigger an EM presupposition while closely related verbs like be certain don’t.
17 A first version of the present account started circulating in the Spring of 2016.
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6 Conclusion
There are two kinds of approaches to the semantics of clausal complements, one that
assumes different types for declarative and interrogative complements and one that
assumes uniform typing. On the first approach, the selectional restrictions of clause-
embedding verbs can to some extent be accounted for in terms of a type-mismatch,
but in the absence of independent motivation for the assumed type distinction and
the type requirements of the relevant verbs, such an account remains stipulative.
On the second approach, the selectional restrictions of clause-embedding verbs
have to be explained entirely based on independently observable properties of the
relevant verbs. In recent work (Ciardelli & Roelofsen 2015; Uegaki 2015b), such
an explanation has been given for the selectional restrictions of rogative verbs like
wonder. The present paper has done so for two classes of anti-rogative verbs.
Within the class of rogative verbs, cases that remain to be explained are verbs of
dependency such as depend on and be determined by, and rogative speech act verbs
such as ask and inquire (see Theiler et al. 2016 for a rough first attempt). Within
the class of anti-rogative verbs, cases that need further attention include speech act
verbs like assert, claim, and suggest, as well as the verb desire which, surprisingly,
is not neg-raising, unlike its close relative want.
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